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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3606 
___________ 
 
BRYAN RARICK, Individually and on behalf  
of a class of similarly situated persons 
 
v. 
 
FEDERATED SERVICE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
 
                        Appellant                                              
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-13-cv-03286) 
District Judge: Honorable Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. 
___________ 
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___________ 
 
No. 16-1328 
___________ 
 
TERRY EASTERDAY;  
LINDA EASTERDAY, h/w individually and on behalf  
of a class of similarly situated persons 
 
v. 
 
THE FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
 
                Appellant                                              
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 5-14-cv-01415) 
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
___________ 
 
Argued November 2, 2016 
Before: CHAGARES, HARDIMAN, and SCIRICA,  
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  March 28, 2017) 
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Charles E. Spevacek [Argued] 
William M. Hart 
Tiffany M. Brown 
Julia J. Nierengarten  
Meagher & Geer 
33 South Sixth Street, Suite 4400 
Minneapolis, MN 55402  
 Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants  
 
James C. Haggerty [Argued] 
Suzanne T. Tighe, Esq. 
Haggerty Goldberg Schleifer & Kupersmith 
1835 Market Street, Suite 2700 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 In Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Company of America, 
316 U.S. 491 (1942), the Supreme Court held that federal 
courts have broad discretion to decline to hear actions arising 
under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Decades later the Court 
reminded federal courts that they have a “virtually unflagging 
obligation” to exercise jurisdiction over actions seeking legal 
relief. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 
424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). But this “unflagging obligation” 
does not undermine the discretion inherent in the Declaratory 
Judgment Act as interpreted in Brillhart. See Wilton v. Seven 
Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286–88 (1995).  
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What about complaints that seek both declaratory and 
legal relief? Our sister courts of appeals and district courts 
within the Third Circuit have disagreed over the legal 
standard applicable in such cases. The United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in the two 
appeals we consider here adopted a “heart of the matter” test 
and, after finding that the essence of each action was 
declaratory, declined to exercise jurisdiction. In our view, the 
heart of the matter test is problematic because it enables 
plaintiffs to avoid federal subject matter jurisdiction through 
artful pleading. Accordingly, we will vacate the orders of the 
District Court and remand the cases for further proceedings.  
I 
A 
A resident of Pennsylvania, Brian Rarick worked for a 
company that insured its vehicles under a business 
automobile policy provided by Federated Service Insurance 
Company, a Minnesota corporation. Under that policy, 
Rarick’s employer waived uninsured motorist coverage for 
most of its employees, including Rarick.  
In his complaint, Rarick alleged that he suffered 
injuries after he crashed a company car insured by Federated 
Service when an unidentified vehicle forced him off the road. 
Rarick reported the accident and submitted a claim to 
Federated Service for uninsured motorist benefits, in 
accordance with the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial 
Responsibility Law, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§  1701, et seq. 
Federated Service denied the claim, citing its waiver of 
uninsured motorist coverage for employees like Rarick.  
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After his claim was denied, Rarick filed a class action 
lawsuit in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 
County, Pennsylvania. Rarick sought, inter alia, a judgment 
declaring that Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial 
Responsibility Law required Federated Service to provide 
Rarick with uninsured motorist coverage. Rarick also 
requested damages for breach of contract alleging—in nearly 
identical language to his prayer for declaratory relief—that 
Federated Service breached its contract by failing to provide 
him with uninsured motorist coverage.  
Federated Service removed Rarick’s civil action to the 
District Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 (removal) and 1332 
(diversity jurisdiction). After the removal, no related case 
remained pending in state court. Later, the District Court 
issued an order to show cause why it should not remand the 
case to the Court of Common Pleas consistent with its 
discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act. 
The District Court adopted a “heart of the matter” test 
to determine whether it had discretion to decline jurisdiction. 
The Court determined that the crux of the litigation was 
declaratory because Rarick sought a declaration that he is 
entitled to uninsured motorist benefits. The Court then 
considered whether it should decline jurisdiction over the 
entire case under our decision in Reifer v. Westport Insurance 
Corp., 751 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2014). Under Reifer, the absence 
of a pending state case created a rebuttable presumption in 
favor of jurisdiction. In light of “the nature and novelty of the 
state law issues,” the Court found the presumption was 
rebutted, so it declined jurisdiction and remanded the case to 
the Court of Common Pleas. Rarick v. Federated Serv. Ins. 
Co., 2015 WL 5677295, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2015). 
Federated Service appealed.  
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B 
Terry Easterday, a resident of Pennsylvania, worked 
for an affiliate of Federated Service called Federated Mutual 
Insurance Company, which is a Minnesota company. 
Federated Mutual had a business automobile policy that 
waived underinsured motorist coverage. 
In his complaint, Easterday alleged that he sustained 
injuries in two rear-end collisions while driving a car owned 
and insured by Federated Mutual. Easterday submitted 
insurance claims seeking tort damages and he later sought 
recovery of underinsured motorist benefits from Federated 
Mutual. The company denied Easterday’s claim citing the 
waiver of underinsured motorist benefits.  
Easterday, along with his wife Linda, sued in the Court 
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania. The 
Easterdays sought, inter alia, a declaration that Pennsylvania 
law required Federated Mutual to provide underinsured 
motorist coverage. The Easterdays also requested damages 
for breach of contract, alleging—in nearly identical language 
to their prayer for declaratory relief—that Federated Mutual 
breached its contract by failing to provide Easterday with 
underinsured motorist coverage.  
Federated Mutual removed the case to the District 
Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 (removal) and 1332 (diversity 
jurisdiction). After the removal, no related case remained 
pending in state court. At a Rule 16 conference in the District 
Court, Easterday raised the issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
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In light of the factual similarities between the two 
cases, the District Court followed Rarick, 2015 WL 5677295. 
The Court found that the heart of the matter was declaratory 
because “[t]he crux of th[e] litigation is whether the insurance 
policy in question provides coverage to the plaintiffs.” 
Easterday v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 2016 WL 492481, *4 
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2016). The Court then turned to Reifer to 
determine whether it should decline jurisdiction. As in 
Rarick, the Court found that although there was no pending 
parallel state court proceeding, it should nonetheless decline 
jurisdiction because of the novel nature of the state law claim 
and the absence of a federal interest. Id. Federated Mutual 
appealed.  
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction in both cases under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1332. We have appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Reifer, 751 F.3d at 133 (holding 
that “a remand order entered pursuant to the [Declaratory 
Judgment Act] is an appealable final decision”). We typically 
review a district court’s decision to decline jurisdiction under 
the Declaratory Judgment Act for abuse of discretion. Id. at 
138–39. However, when a district court declines jurisdiction 
of non-declaratory matters, we “review[] the underlying legal 
questions de novo but the court’s decision to abstain for abuse 
of discretion.” Nat’l City Mortg. Co. v. Stephen, 647 F.3d 78, 
82 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Here, we must first 
decide whether the District Court applied the appropriate 
legal standard to ascertain its discretion to decline 
jurisdiction. We review that question of law de novo. 
 8 
 
III 
A 
A federal district court’s discretion to decline 
jurisdiction depends on whether the complaint seeks legal or 
declaratory relief. When an action seeks legal relief, federal 
courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise 
jurisdiction. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817. There are but a few 
“extraordinary and narrow exception[s]” to this rule. Id. at 
813.  
When an action seeks declaratory relief, however, 
federal courts may decline jurisdiction under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (“In a case of actual 
controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United 
States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of 
any interested party seeking such declaration . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). Courts have greater discretion to decline jurisdiction 
over actions for declaratory judgments because they seek an 
adjudication of rights and obligations prior to the enforcement 
of a remedy. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 
U.S. 667, 671–72 (1950); see also Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. 
v. Wyse Tech., 912 F.2d 643, 649 (3d Cir. 1990) (“The idea 
behind the [Declaratory Judgment Act] was to clarify legal 
relationships so that plaintiffs (and possibly defendants) could 
make responsible decisions about the future.”); 10B Charles 
A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. 
§ 2751 (4th ed.) (“[The Act] gives a means by which rights 
and obligations may be adjudicated in cases involving an 
actual controversy that has not reached the stage at which 
either party may seek a coercive remedy and in cases in 
which a party who could sue for coercive relief has not yet 
done so.”). The Supreme Court first confirmed federal courts’ 
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discretion to decline jurisdiction over declaratory judgment 
actions in Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495–96, and reaffirmed this 
discretion in Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288. 
B 
Before today “[w]e have never ruled on the legal 
standard a district court must apply when addressing whether 
it may decline jurisdiction when both declaratory and legal 
relief are claimed.” Reifer, 751 F.3d at 135 n.5. Federal courts 
opining on the matter have developed three main approaches.  
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, 
Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have adopted a bright line rule that 
prioritizes a federal court’s duty to hear claims for legal relief 
over its discretion to decline jurisdiction to hear declaratory 
judgment actions. Under that rule, “[t]he Colorado River 
standard applies to all mixed claims—even when the ‘claims 
for coercive relief are merely “ancillary” to [a party’s] request 
for declaratory relief.’” VonRosenberg v. Lawrence, 781 F.3d 
731, 735 (4th Cir. 2015), as amended (Apr. 17, 2015) 
(alterations in original) (quoting Black Sea Inv., Ltd. v. United 
Heritage Corp., 204 F.3d 647, 652 (5th Cir. 2000)); see also 
New Eng. Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 561 F.3d 392, 397 (5th Cir. 
2009) (per curiam) (“[W]hen an action contains any claim for 
coercive relief, the Colorado River abstention doctrine is 
ordinarily applicable.” (citation omitted)); Vill. of Westfield v. 
Welch’s, 170 F.3d 116, 124 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999). These courts 
generally have found that Colorado River’s “unflagging 
obligation” to entertain legal claims supersedes any discretion 
to decline jurisdiction over a declaratory claim in the same 
suit. See VonRosenberg, 781 F.3d at 735 (depriving access to 
a federal forum simply because there is a request for 
declaratory relief “seems especially unwarranted given that 
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nearly all claims, including those for damages or injunctive 
relief, effectively ask a court to declare the rights of the 
parties to the suit”). 
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit and Ninth Circuit have taken a slightly different 
approach, applying an independent claim test, which balances 
the court’s duty to hear legal claims with its discretion to 
decline jurisdiction over claims for declaratory relief. Under 
this test, the district court first determines whether claims 
seeking legal relief are independent of claims for declaratory 
relief. R.R. St. & Co., Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 569 F.3d 
711, 716–17 (7th Cir. 2009). “Non-declaratory claims are 
‘independent’ of a declaratory claim when they are alone 
sufficient to invoke the court’s subject matter jurisdiction and 
can be adjudicated without the requested declaratory relief.” 
Id. at 715 (citing United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. R&D Latex Corp., 
242 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2001)). If the legal claims are 
dependent on the declaratory claims, the court may decline 
jurisdiction over the entire action. Id. at 716–17. But if they 
are independent, the court must adjudicate the legal claims 
unless there are exceptional circumstances as described in 
Colorado River. Id. When the legal claims are independent, 
courts generally will not decline the declaratory judgment 
action in order to avoid piecemeal litigation. R.R. St. & Co., 
569 F.3d at 715–16. “Where the [legal] claims are not 
independent, the district court has discretion under 
Wilton/Brillhart to abstain from hearing the entire action.” Id. 
at 716.  
 Finally, district courts in the Third Circuit, following 
the approach taken by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit in Royal Indem. Co. v. Apex Oil Co., 511 
F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 2008), primarily have applied the “heart of 
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the matter” or “essence of the lawsuit” test. Under that test, 
the court “examines the relationship between the claims, and 
determines what the ‘essence of the dispute’ concerns.” Elec. 
Claims Processing, Inc. v. M.R. Sethi, M.D., S.C., 2013 WL 
243594, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2013) (quoting ITT Indus., 
Inc. v. Pac. Emp’rs. Ins., 427 F. Supp. 2d 552, 566–67 (E.D. 
Pa. 2006)). This approach seeks to “balance between the 
various interests at stake” by examining the crux of the 
litigation. Id. (quoting Columbia Gas of Pa. v. Am. Int’l Grp., 
2011 WL 294520, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2011)). Courts 
applying this test have found that the “administrative, 
jurisprudential, and other concerns” of mixed action litigation 
make it “fundamentally reasonable to pull a dependent 
coercive claim within the ambit of the discretion afforded its 
declaratory counterpart.” Columbia Gas, 2011 WL 294520, at 
*2. On this view, to allow an ancillary or dependent legal 
claim to eliminate the court’s discretion under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, “would be the tail wagging the dog.” Id. 
(quoting Franklin Commons E. P’ship v. Abex Corp., 997 F. 
Supp. 585, 592 (D.N.J. 1998)).  
C 
The District Court in both cases under review here 
adopted the “heart of the matter” test. In Rarick, the Court 
was persuaded that the “Supreme Court’s specific recognition 
that declaratory judgment actions necessitate a different 
treatment than other types of cases” required the court to 
analyze the facts of a mixed claim before deciding whether it 
should decline jurisdiction. 2015 WL 5677295, at *4 (quoting 
ITT Indus., Inc., 427 F. Supp. at 557). Using similar 
reasoning, the District Court in Easterday adopted the heart 
of the matter test because it found “that the outcome of the 
plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract and bad faith are 
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dependent on how the insurance policies are interpreted for 
the declaratory judgment claim.” 2016 WL 492481, at *3 n.2.  
 After careful consideration of the various tests applied 
in the decisions mentioned, we hold that the independent 
claim test is the most appropriate one. When a complaint 
contains claims for both legal and declaratory relief, a district 
court must determine whether the legal claims are 
independent of the declaratory claims. If the legal claims are 
independent, the court has a “virtually unflagging obligation” 
to hear those claims, subject of course to Colorado River’s 
exceptional circumstances. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817–19. 
If the legal claims are dependent on the declaratory claims, 
however, the court retains discretion to decline jurisdiction of 
the entire action, consistent with our decision in Reifer, 751 
F.3d at 144–46.   
The independent claim test is superior to the others 
principally because it prevents plaintiffs from evading federal 
jurisdiction through artful pleading. Although Rarick and 
Easterday included declaratory claims in their complaints, 
they requested a legal remedy—damages—for breach of 
contract. Because both cases satisfied the requirements for 
diversity jurisdiction, Rarick and Easterday could have 
obtained their desired relief in federal courts without 
requesting a declaratory judgment. By including a declaratory 
claim in their pleadings, however, Rarick and Easterday 
invited the District Court to avoid Colorado River’s “virtually 
unflagging obligation” in favor of the more expansive 
discretion afforded under Reifer.  
This outcome is inconsistent with the purpose of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, which is to “clarify legal 
relationships” in order to help putative litigants “make 
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responsible decisions about the future.” Step-Saver Data Sys., 
912 F.2d at 649. The Declaratory Judgment Act was intended 
to “enlarge[] the range of remedies available in the federal 
courts” by authorizing them to adjudicate rights and 
obligations even though no immediate remedy is requested. 
Skelly Oil Co., 339 U.S. at 671 (emphasis added). The heart 
of the matter test enables plaintiffs to subvert this goal by 
using the Declaratory Judgment Act to avoid federal subject 
matter jurisdiction over claims that are ripe for adjudication 
and in which the plaintiffs seek immediate relief.    
Another virtue of the independent claim test is that it 
gives district courts the flexibility that the bright line test 
precludes. We agree with the Seventh Circuit when it opined: 
“we do not think the mere fact that a litigant seeks some non-
frivolous, non-declaratory relief in addition to declaratory 
relief means that a district court’s Wilton/Brillhart discretion 
to decline to hear the declaratory claim should be supplanted 
by the narrow Colorado River doctrine.” R.R. Street & Co, 
Inc., 569 F.3d at 716. We also agree that while the bright line 
test is more easily applied by courts, “it unduly curtails a 
district court’s ‘unique and substantial discretion’ to abstain 
from hearing claims for declaratory relief.” Id. (quoting 
Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286).  
IV 
We hold that the independent claim test is the 
applicable legal standard for review of a complaint that seeks 
both legal and declaratory relief. In these cases, both 
Plaintiffs’ legal claims were independent of their declaratory 
claims. Accordingly, we will vacate the judgments of the 
District Court and remand the cases for a determination 
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whether exceptional circumstances exist under Colorado 
River. 
